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"SELECTIVE INCORPORATION" IN THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
LOUIS HENKINt
DURING recent Terms, four justices of the Supreme Court of the United
States espoused a doctrine of "selective incorporation"; the fourteenth amend-
ment incorporates specific provisions of the Bill of Rights, and those that are
"absorbed" at all are incorporated whole and intact, providing protections
against the states exactly congruent with those against the federal govern-
ment.' Of the other justices presently sitting, one has rejected this view, while
the others have not felt compelled to address themselves directly to it.2 Stu-
dents of the Court have been strangely silent about this interpretation of the
Constitution, perhaps holding breath while it hovers on the brink of obtaining
a majority in a changing Court. Since this doctrine would be a major tenet
of constitutional jurisprudence, relevant to the resolution of issues which come
regularly before the Court, it seems appropriate to draw attention to it, to
examine its credentials, to consider its implications.
Before examining the doctrine of selective incorporation, it may help to re-
call its background. From the beginning, the Court has rejected the claim that
the fourteenth amendment subjected the states to all the limitations in the
Bill of Rights, which were originally written to govern the federal government
only.3 In 1947, in Adamson v. California,4 three Justices joined Mr. Justice
itHamilton Fish Professor of International Law and Diplomacy, Columbia University
School of Law.
1. This view was expounded by Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by the Chief Justice and
Justices Black and Douglas, in an opinion in Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 274-
76 (1960), and again in Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Cohen v. Hurley, 336 U.S.
117, 154 (1961). Compare Douglas, J., concurring in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
345-47 (1963). It may have been suggested earlier by Mr. Justice Black in his dissent in
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 85-86 (1947), but to him and to Justice Douglas this
was a compromise, less desirable than complete incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the
fourteenth amendment. See text accompanying note 4 infra. We shall call the latter the
Black doctrine as distinguished from the Brennan doctrine which is the subject of these
pages.
2. During the last term of Court, eight Justices held that the standards for permissible
search and seizure were the same for the states as for the federal government. Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). A unanimous Court also held in effect that the states must
provide counsel to the indigent in criminal cases, as is required of the federal government.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In both cases the opinion of the Court reached
the result while skirting the doctrine of incorporation. Mr. Justice Harlan's concurrence
in the latter case and his dissent in the former indicate that he definitely rejects incorpora-
tion. See also Justice Harlan's concurrence in Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 147 (1962),
and note 38 infra.
3. E.g., in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78 (1908). The leading contemporary cases are Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
(1937), and Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). Mr. Justice Frankfurter has been the
leading contemporary spokesman for the traditional interpretation of due process, for ex-
ample in his concurring opinion in Adamson, supra at 59-68.
4. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
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Black in a strong bid to overrule the accepted view and hold that the four-
teenth amendment did apply to the states the whole of the Bill of Rights. Of
the four dissenters in Adamson, Justices Black and Douglas remain on the
Court and have maintained their views, but no others have seen fit to join
them.5
In rejecting the suggestion that section one of the fourteenth amendment, or
any of its clauses, made the entire Bill of Rights applicable to the states, the
Supreme Court did not hold that the amendment afforded no similar protec-
tions at all. The Court has developed "substantive due process," imposing
limitations on the states which include some similar to the prohibitions in the
first and fourth amendments. The Court has also found in the due process
clause "procedural due process": this requires of the states those procedures
which, in Mr. justice Cardozo's phrases, are "so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental," which are "of the
very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty"; it forbids to the states that which
"is repugnant to the conscience of mankind." Procedure by procedure, case
by case, the Court has decided whether particular actions of the state did or
did not conform to "ordered liberty," to due process of law. Recent years have
seen the Court increase steadily the procedural content of the due process
clause and its limitations on the states.7 In other -cases, dissenting Justices
would have had the Court increase still further the requirements of procedural
due process, sometimes to make them coterminous with limitations imposed by
the Bill of Rights on the federal government.8
Selective incorporation would apply to the states the substantive provisions
of the first and fourth amendments, imposing the same limitations that these
amendments place on the federal government.9 The principal target of the pro-
ponents of incorporation has been criminal procedure and the ordered liberty
approach of the Adamson case. If the due process clause forbids only that
which violates "ordered liberty," every challenged procedure must make its
own way into the conscience of mankind as the Court reads that conscience.
In each case it is necessary to decide whether what was done is so gross as to
5. Justice Douglas reasserted his Adamson view last term, expressing the hope that
it may yet obtain a majority. See his concurring opinion in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 345 (1963). In Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 275 (1960), Mr. Justice
Brennan and the Chief Justice indicated that they "have neither accepted nor rejected that
view."
6. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) ; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1938); id. at 323.
7. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963). And see, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) ; Thompson v. Louisville, 362
U.S. 199 (1960) ; Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
8. In addition to Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), and Cohen v. Hurley, 366
U.S. 117 (1961), see, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) ; cf.
Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), and Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263
(1960). And see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963), which overruled earlier cases setting lower standards for the states.
9. See text accompanying note 37 infra.
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be unfair or uncivilized. Even where a safeguard is found to be required by
due process, it may not be as extensive as the procedural safeguards required
of the federal government by the appropriate, specific provision of the Bill of
Rights. The doctrine of selective incorporation might make it possible to in-
crease the procedural protections of the due process clause in substantial leaps.
Under this doctrine, the Court apparently would not look at the procedure
followed by a state in a particular case to determine whether it shocks the
conscience of mankind. Rather it would hold to the light of due process the
vjarious provisions of the Bill of Rights.10 If a particular provision is incor-
porated within the due process clause, that provision applies to the states to
the same extent and in the same ways as it does to the federal government.
Thus, not only the freedoms of the first amendment and the right to be
secure from unreasonable search and seizure, but also the right to counsel, the
provision against cruel and unusual punishment, even the freedom from double
jeopardy and the privilege against self-incrimination, might apply to the states
in their full, federal measure.
"Selective incorporation" may represent a compromise with Mr. Justice
Black's view of incorporation of the whole Bill of Rights. Perhaps, indeed, it
is an effort to achieve, more acceptably, substantially what Mr. Justice Black's
position in Adamson sought to achieve and failed to achieve. It might be more
acceptable in that it does not depend on Justice Black's views of the history
of thd amendment and the intention of its draftsmen, views which historians
have challenged." Selective incorporation does not so clearly require over-
ruling the consistent; often reaffirmed, and almost unanimous jurisprudence
'of the Court for nearly a hundred years. And since it does not involve auto-
matic absorption of the whole of the Bill of Rights, selective incorporation
permits the abandonment, as regards the states, of one or more provisions of
the Bill 'of Rights'that seem less important and would be too onerous-say,
'that dated provision' in the seventh amendment requiring a jury trial in civil
cases where the'value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars. 'For the rest,
elective incorporation could apply to the states all the "important" provisions
of the Bill of Rights in their full and growing vigor. Moreover, unlike Mr.
Justice Black's position, this view, presumably, does not preclude the Court
from finding in the due process clause additional protections not found in any
of the specifics of the Bill of Rights.12
10. Presumably, if the state action complained of does not correspond to any rubric in
the Bill of Rights, Mr. Justice Brennan would apply the test of ordered liberty directly,
finding in it some limitations beyond the specifics of the Bill of Rights. In this respect he
would join Justices Murphy and Rutledge. Compare their dissenting opinion in Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 124, with that of Justices Black and Douglas, id. at 68.
11. See Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2
STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949) ; and Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Include the Bill
of Rights?, id. at 140.
12. See note 10 supra. Since Adamson, Justices Black and Douglas, too, have been
willing to find state violations of due process that do not readily correspond to any specific
provision in the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) ; Leland v.
Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802 (1948) (Frankfurter and Black, JJ., dissenting) ; United States
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In addition to its promise to raise the standards of -individual protectioh
against the states to the higher, federal level, the proposed doctrine has other
claims. It is difficult, says Justice Brennan, the chief proponent, to "follow
the logic which applies [to the states] a particular specific [of the Bill of
Rights] for' some purposes and denies its application for others," or to per-
ceive what warrant there is for applying to the states only a "watered-down,
subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights. . .."13
The suggested doctrine also appears to avoid the impression of personal, ad
hoc adjudication by every court which attempts to apply the vague contents
and contours of "ordered liberty" to every different case that comes before it.
Finally, in respects here relevant, the citizen does not distinguish between
state and federal government ;14 he may not understand why the same stand-
ards should not apply. If he reads his Constitution, most of the Bill of Rights
is addressed at large, not expressly to the federal government alone; he may
not understand why he should not enjoy against the states what the Bill of
Rights says is his right. Similar standards for state and nation, moreover,
would simplify constitutional jurisprudence, the administration of justice, and
cooperation between state and federal agencies.
The thesis, and its consequences, are appealing. That it has not, to date,
obtained a majority may reflect its difficulties. Principally, perhaps, it is diffi-
cult to find it in the Constitution, as it was written or as it has developed.
Even leaving aside considerations of federalism that might militate against
such interpretation of the amendment, the burden in logic and in law, surely,
is not on those who would claim that the states are subject to lesser limita-
tions than were imposed on the federal government. Initially, at least, the
burden is on those who would invalidate action of a state to find in the Con-
stitution some relevant limitation. And the burden of showing that specifics
of the Bill of Rights, admittedly written only as limitations on the federal
government, are at all relevant to the powers of the states, and in what way,
is on those who would assert such relevance. Selective incorporation finds no
support in the language of the amendment, or in the history of its adoption.
Indeed it is more difficult to justify than Justice Black's position that the Bill
of Rights was wholly incorporated. There is some evidence that some persons
associated with the adoption of the amendment contemplated that it might ap-
ply the Bill of Rights to the states. 15 There is no evidence, and- it is difficult
ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561, 570 (1953) (Frankfurter, Black and Douglas, JJ., dis-
senting) ; Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957) ; Caritatio v. California, 357 U.S. 549, 552
(1958) (dissenting opinion joined by Douglas, ..) ; Scull v. Virginia ex rel. Comm. on Land
Reform & Racial Activities, 359 U.S. 344 (1959); Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S.
199 (1960).
13. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 158 (1961) ; see Ohio e-- rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S.
263, 275 (1960). Justice Brennan argues also that the First and Fourth Amendments have
been absorbed and that there is no reason to consider the rights secured by some later
amendments less important. See note 47 infra.
14. Cf. Black, J., dissenting in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 155 (1959).
15. See Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion and Appendix in Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46,68,92 (1947).
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to conceive, that anyone thought or intended that the amendment should im-
pose on the states a selective incorporation. In the absence of any special in-
tention revealed in the history of the amendment, we have only the language
to look to. It is conceivable, again, that the phrase "privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States" might include a reference to the whole Bill
of Rights.' 6 Surely there is no basis for finding that some "specifics" of the
Bill of Rights are, while others are not, privileges and immunities of national
citizenship. Even the phrase "due process of law" might conceivably be a
short-hand expression for the whole Bill of Rights. It is hardly possible to
see in that phrase some purpose to select some specifics of the Bill of Rights
and an insistence that they be selected whole.
In fact, it should be clear, the Court has not read "due process of law" as
a short-hand way of referring to specifics of the Bill of Rights. (It could hard-
ly have so read a clause which restates, identically, only one single provision
of only one of the early amendments.) To find in that phrase any limitations
at all it had to give meaning and content to the phrase "due process of law."
It found protection for "liberty," including the liberties mentioned in the first
and fourth amendments, in notions of "substantive due process." Of this,
we treat separately later. In regard to procedural due process, the Court held
that the "process" that is "due"--say, in criminal proceedings- is what is
required by the conscience of mankind. That is the essential link between the
constitutional language and purport and all the procedural limitations which
the Court applies to the states under this provision. So far as here relevant,
then, all that is required of the states is that which is due because it is "funda-
mental," because its denial would shock the conscience of mankind. There is
no relation-historical, linguistic or logical-between that standard and the
specific provisions, or any specific provision, of the Bill of Rights.' 7 At bottom,
it is difficult even to ask meaningfully whether a specific of the Bill of Rights
is incorporated in ordered liberty. That a particular procedure or action is
required of, or forbidden to, the federal government by a provision of the Bill
of Rights is some evidence that it may be required, or forbidden, by the con-
science of mankind. But this indirect relevance of the Bill of Rights to deter-
mine the content of "due process of law" cannot support the view that any
provision of the Bill of Rights, in its total federal import, is either all in, or
all out of, this standard of ordered liberty. Some specifics of the Bill of Rights,
in all their manifestations, may indeed be "process" which is required by the
conscience of mankind; others may not. Some elements or aspects of a specific
may be required by the conscience of mankind; others may not.
16. This was argued, and rejected, in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 93-99 (1903).
Mr. Justice Black does not rely on the privileges and immunities clause alone: perhaps he
recognizes the difficulty, inter alia, that the provisions of the Bill of Rights are not rights of
citizens~only but are enjoyed by non-citizens as well. Similarly, any protections against the
states which the privileges and immunities clause would afford would, by its terms, be en-
joyed only by citizens.
17. See note 20 and text accompanying note 23 infra.
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So far as it would incorporate, in procedural due process, procedural pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights, then, the proposed doctrine does not appear to
be one that can be reasonably arrived at from the language and history of the
fourteenth amendment, or from its development in the constitutional juris-
prundence of the Supreme Court. It does find its roots in language used by
the Supreme Court in some of the cases. Where a claimant urged that the
state had denied him due process-say by denying him a right to be repre-
sented by counsel in a criminal case-the issue properly raised was whether
the right to counsel, in the circumstances, was a fundamental right, essential
to ordered liberty. That the claimant would have counsel as of right in a com-
parable federal proceeding would be, we have said, some evidence that it may
be fundamental. But counsel, as well as the Justices, sometimes framed the
issue as whether "the right to counsel" was "incorporated," "absorbed," or
"applied" to the states by the fourteenth amendment. If the queston is
whether a right contained in the Bill of Rights is "incorporated," one may
argue that the right "incorporated," as if by reference, must be the same right
with the same meaning and the same scope.
In order to determine whether a particular procedural safeguard, in a par-
ticular case or in all cases, is "due" process, i.e., is required by the conscience
of mankind, it does not appear apt or relevant to ask whether a particular
provision of the Bill of Rights is "incorporated" in due process. In any event,
in regard to standards of criminal procedure at least, no case has said that a
specific provision in the Bill of Rights, or a federal standard, is being "in-
corporated."' 8 A right of counsel, one might say, was incorporated in the
fourteenth amendment, but not necessarily the same right of counsel given
in the fifth amendment.' What is clear, too, is that the Court could-and
did-justify any such "incorporation" only by finding it in the concept of
ordered liberty that is due process. 2° Incorporation then does not, and cannot,
avoid reference to the uncertain, debatable, changeable touchstone of ordered
liberty. And incorporation, by reference to ordered liberty, cannot claim that
specific procedural provisions in the Bill of Rights are incorporated "whole."
Ordered liberty, indeed, may for some safeguards require exactly what is re-
18. The Court may have said that a specific provision of the Bill of Rights-say, the
privilege against self-incrimination-was not incorporated. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78 (1908). That, too, was careless and unnecessary. The issue before the Court in that case
was only whether what the state there did-permitting the prosecution to comment on the
defendant's failure to take the stand-was consistent with fairness and ordered liberty. See
text accompanying note 26 infra. In any event, that a particular provision of the Bill of
Rights may not be incorporated at all, does not imply that other provisions, which may be
incorporated, must be incorporated whole.
19. Cf. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) ; compare Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455
(1942), overruled, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
20. As to the rights "incorporated," the Court in Twining said: "If this is so, it is not
because those rights are enumerated in the first eight amendments, but because they are of
such a nature that they are included in the conception of due process of law." Twining v.
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908). See, too, Mr. Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319,327 (1937). See text accompanying note 23 infra.
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quired by the Bill of Rights. But it can as well require less, or more. Nothing
in that concept suggests that if it includes some procedure akin to one in the
Bill of Rights, it must be of exactly the same size, shape, scope as the federal
protection.
It has sometimes been claimed that this doctrine of selective incorporation
derives from Justice Cardozo's opinion for the Court in Palko v. Connecticut.2'
We shall deal later with the dictum of Mr. Justice Cardozo about "absorp-
tion" within the Fourteenth Amendment of basic substantive freedoms like
.those in the First Amendment.2 2 But in regard to the criminal procedures re-
quired in the later amendments, for which the doctrine is now invoked, Palko
was not applying a doctrine of incorporation as distinguished from a touch-
stone of "ordered liberty." It was in this case, involving criminal procedure,
that Justice Cardozo coined "ordered liberty." Nor did the Court ask whether
some specific of the Bill of Rights was incorporated in "ordered liberty." In
fact, in setting forth ordered liberty as the meaning of due process, Justice
Cardozo said that whether procedure claimed to be required of a state would
have been required of the federal government by a specific provision in the
Bill of Rights was not the question. Speaking, with apparent approval, of
.Powell v. Alabama, he said:
The decision did not turn upon the fact that the benefit of counsel would
have been guaranteed to the defendants by the provisions of the Sixth
Amendment if they had been prosecuted in a federal court. The decision
turned upon the fact that in the particular situation laid before us in the
evidence the benefit of counsel was essential to the substance of a hear-
ing.23
Most important, Mr. Justice Cardozo quite clearly rejected the principal
focus of the proposed doctrine-that specifics must be incorporated whole. In
that case the Court held that it was not a denial of due process for the State
of Connecticut to appeal error in Palko's first trial and upon reversal to bring
Tiim to trial again and convict him. Since the Court assumed that this would
be forbidden to the federal government as "double jeopardy," it is sometimes
said that the Court held that the provision against double jeopardy in the
fifth amendment was not incorporated into the fourteenth amendment. In
fact, the Court held, and could have held, nothing of the kind. It held nothing
with regard to the fifth amendment; it held only that what Connecticut did
was not a violation of due process. But if it be deemed to have held anything
about the incorporation of the provision against double jeopardy, it held only
that.federal double jeopardy in all its aspects and reach was not incorporated
21. 302 U.S. 319 (1937). See the opinions of Mr. Justice Brennan in the cases cited in
note 1 supra. See also Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. at 46,
85-86 (1947). "If the choice must be between the selective process of the Palko decision ap-
plying some of the Bill of Rights to the States, or theTwining rule applying none of them, I
would choose the Palko selective process." Id. at 89. Mr. Justice Black, of course, did not
feel limited to this choice.
22. Palko v..Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326, quoted at note 37 infra.
23. Id. at 327, referring to Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) ; see also 302 U.S. at
324-25.
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in due process. It expressly reserved the possibility that some parts of the
federal protection against double jeopardy might-if you will-be incorporated
in due process: "What the answer would have to be if the state were permitted
after a trial free from error to try the accused over again or to bring another
case against him, we have no occasion to consider."' 4 One could hardly doubt,
indeed, that such "true" double jeopardy would have been held by Justice
Cardozo, and that Court, to be a violation of due process. 25 If so, Palko clear-
ly does not support a doctrine that procedural "specifics" which are incor-
porated at all must be incorporated whole. In fact, since "hard core" double
jeopardy would almost certainly be "incorporated," once the Court so held,
the doctrine of selective incorporation would require the Court to apply the
double jeopardy provision whole, and to overrule Palko!
The Court has also consistently negated the doctrine of "incorporation
whole" in the cases involving the so-called privilege against self-incrimination.
It is sometimes said-even by the Justices-that the Court has refused to find
that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the fifth amendment's pro-
vision that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. In
fact, the Court held only that the state did not violate due process if it per-
mitted the prosecution to comment on the failure of Twining, or Adamson,
to take the stand.2 6 If it held that to this extent the privilege of the fifth
amendment was not "incorporated," so be it. At the same time, and with full
awareness, the Court has-if one would speak in terms of incorporation of
specifics-repeatedly held applicable to the states that part of the privilege
not to be compelled to testify against oneself which bars the use of coerced
confessions. 2 7 These two strands of self-incrimination cases have existed -side
by side, and have been applied consistently by the Court, including many of
the Justices who sat in Palko. There was never any suggestion that these cases
were inconsistent with each other, or with some constitutional doctrine of
selective incorporation.28
24. Id. at 328. Earlier the Court emphasized that it was talking only about the particu-
lar kind of double jeopardy in the case: "Is double jeopardy in such circumstances, if double
jeopardy it must be called, a denial of due process forbidden to the states?" Id. at 323. And
later: "Is that kind of double jeopardy to which the statute has subjected him a hardship so
acute and so shocking that our polity will not endure it ?" Id. at 328.
25. Compare Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 468-69 (1958); United States v.
Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 197 (1820).
26. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) ; Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46
(1947). See note 18 supra. Both Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Black recognized the
limits of the holding, urging that Twining did not conclude the case before the Court, in
their dissents in Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 134-35 n.10, 159 (1961). Mr. Justice Black
had also recognized earlier that in these self-incrimination cases the Court was negating
any notion of total incorporation, applying to the states part of the federal privilege but not
all of it. See his dissent in Adamson, 332 U.S. at 86.
27. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) ; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227
(1940).
28. These self-incrimination and double jeopardy cases, of course, re.veal the corollary
of the proposed doctrine. Selective incorporation means that the Fourteenth Amendment
takes all of a federal provision, or it takes none of it. The:Court could not, then, keep both
1963]
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These difficulties suggest that the proposed doctrine would seek possible
additional protections for the individual on the wings of inadequate analysis,
in the face of the language and history of the fourteenth amendment, and
almost a hundred years of constitutional jurisprudence. One may well ask,
moreover, what is gained. In fact, selective incorporation cannot avoid the
difficulties of the traditional doctrine. Try as one might to avoid the phrase,
"ordered liberty" or something much like it remains as the principle of selec-
tion, to determine which specifics are "incorporated," and which are not.
(Some such standard is applied, too, where there is a challenge to a procedure
which does not correspond to any federal specific.) That judgment of selection
is as likely to be "subjective" as is the application of the traditional standard.
And if the traditional approach sometimes applies a "watered-down" version
of some federal procedural specific, one can as well challenge selective incor-
poration as a watered-down version of incorporation of the entire Bill of
Rights.
Most important, perhaps, accepting the need or the desirability of increas-
ing constitutional protections against the states, one may yet ask whether this
doctrine is really necessary. If the federal standard is indeed the goal in some
instances, the Court can, without any difficult new doctrine, find the federal
standard to be required by ordered liberty or by other elements in the Court's
jurisprudence. That is now the case with the right to counsel.2 9 The Court has
also found it possible to justify identical standards in regard to exclusion of the
fruits of unreasonable search and seizure, not from any notion of total incor-
poration, but because of convenience in administration and in federal-state
cooperation in the enforcement of criminal law. 30 Federalism and stare decisis
apart, without any new doctrine the flexibility and vitality of the concept of
ordered liberty 31 would permit the extension today to the states of the heart
Adamson and the coerced confession cases, both Palko and a rule against "hard-core" double
jeopardy. Overruling Adamson and Palko, even on their limited facts, may indeed be what
the Brennan doctrine intends. But this all-or-nothing doctrine could, with equal logic, lead to
the opposite conclusion. If some part of a "specific" is not included in due process, none of it
can be; or, since whether a provision is to be incorporated must still depend on its inclusion
in "ordered liberty," if a federal specific includes elements which are shocking and elements
which are not, it may be as reasonable to exclude the provision from the fourteenth
amendment as to include it. Thus, the Court, having long ago decided Twining and
Palko, might be held to have decided that the whole federal privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, and the whole rule against double jeopardy, are excluded from the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Repeated trials and coerced confessions, then, should not be barred to the states either.
And new applications involving self-incrimination or double jeopardy should also be per-
mitted although these may, in fact, shock the conscience.
29. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
30. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) ; cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). And,
as the Ker case shows, getting the federal standard does not assure that the result will be
different; a majority of the Court found that it was not violated.
Security against unreasonable search and seizure is, in the first instance, a substantive
right, part of substantive due process. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting, in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 472 (1928) ; compare his dissent in United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 451 (1922).
See Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring in Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945),
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of concepts against double jeopardy, perhaps even against self-incrimination
-the only safeguards now apparently in issue-without necessarily saddling
all the states with what may be peripheral survivals or accretions in the Bill
of Rights. 32 Of course, if the Justices are not to be imposing their own notions
of what is desirable procedure, they can only find these new protections in the
fourteenth amendment if they are satisfied that they are indeed required by
some impersonal, objective, determinable (if difficult to determine) standard
of community conscience. But a similar reference to some similar standard, we
have said, could not be avoided if the Court asked anew, for example, "whether
the privilege against self-incrimination is incorporated." There is no constitu-
tional language, no established doctrine, no old case, that can be invoked to
avoid the inevitable question of ordered liberty.
There is indeed a kind of inversion about attempting today to increase the
content of procedural due process vis-A-vis the states through wholesale in-
corporation of complete provisions of the Bill of Rights. For in regard to the
federal government the Court has also been extending constitutional liberties
and protections. It has done so in part by recognizing distinct content in the
due process clause of the fifth amendment and applying notions of fairness
and ordered liberty there.3 3 It has done so even more by developing the flexible
standards of some of the provisions--"unreasonable" search and seizure, "cruel
and unusual" punishment, even "double jeopardy. '3 4 The Court, surely, is
and in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) ; and see
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530 (1884).
32. If selective incorporation accepts that some specifics-like the twenty-dollar rule in
the seventh amendment-are outdated, one might leave open the possibility that some
specific provision retaining vitality may have accumulated insignificances or anachronisms
that should not be imposed on the states.
In fact the practice upheld in Palko is rare and that in Adamson if less rare may not be
shocking, or even important. But even if the Court should conclude that, on their facts too,
cases like Palko and Adamson now represent an older, less sensitive conscience, it does not
require any difficult, novel doctrine to justify their re-examination. It would be easier by
far to overrule a case than to construct a new jurisprudence for the fourteenth amendment.
In fact, of course, older due process cases need not be overruled as erroneously decided;
traditional jurisprudence recognizes that due process is a vital concept, its requirements
growing with increased enlightenment. See cases cited note 31 mrpra. In regard to Adanwon,
in particular, one can also recognize that the Court there, as in Twining, held only that the
particular state practice in question did not violate ordered liberty; the Court has not really
considered whether the process due today permits other forms of compelling a person to give
witness against himself. See note 26 supra.
33. See, e.g., Crain v. United States, 162 U.S. 625, 645 (1896) ; Japanese Immigrant
case, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903) ; Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1938) ;
Wong Tang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50 (1950) ; cf. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420
(1960). The invocation of due process against the federal government has become less fre-
quent as the Court began to expand the specifics, note 34 infra, and to require even higher
standards under its supervisory powers over federal courts and federal administration of
justice. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) ; Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214
(1956) ; Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 49 (1957).
34. See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) ; Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86 (1958) ; United States v. Green, 355 U.S. 184 (1957) ; Fong Foo v. United States, 369
U.S. 141 (1962) ; see also United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
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aware that though it is ostensibly applying a "specific," the specific is not very
specific; and in seeking a standard for developing these and other ambiguities
the Court has inevitably applied contemporary notions of fairness-not very
different from "ordered liberty." Sometimes, it seems, the Court has stretched
quite far the language of one of the specifics to achieve in effect what it
thought required by new communal enlightenment. One may wonder, then,
whether in regard to both state and federal governments, the Court might not
better look less to the procedural specifics of the Bill of Rights and exploit
rather the more flexible notion of due process in both the fifth and four-
teenth amendments to achieve identical and contemporary standards of liberty
under ordered government. To Mr. Justice Black this approach may still be
abhorrent because it leaves the courts at large with too much discretion.35
Most of the Justices, one might guess, would not find this discretion distress-
ingly larger than is in play when the Court develops the mentioned ambiguities
of the Bill of Rights, or applies the due process clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment, or decrees notions of propriety under the Court's supervisory powers,
where there is no applicable specific.3 6
Substantive Due Process and the Substantive Amendments
Palko v. Connecticut, it seems clear, is not authority for any general doc-
trine that specifics of the Bill of Rights are incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment. It is surely not authority-indeed it negates-a doctrine that
insists that any federal specific which is at all reflected in "due process" must
be incorporated whole. Neither Palko nor any other case, nor independent in-
quiry, has suggested any acceptable basis for incorporating whole federal
specifics in the procedural amendments. But Cardozo's dictum in Palko may
suggest incorporation, possibly incorporation whole, of "the privileges and
immunities that have been taken over from the earlier articles of the federal
bill of rights and brought within the fourteenth amendment by a process of
absorption. 3 7 For these important substantive rights-the freedom of speech,
press and religion, separation of church and state, privacy against unreason-
able search and seizure-protection against encroachment by the states has
also been found in the due process clause, in "substantive due process." That
these freedoms are protected against the states to exactly the same extent as
against federal abridgment has been asserted, and questioned.3 8 I venture to
35. See, e.g., his dissent in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 90-92 (1947).
36. For examples of the latter, see cases cited supra note 33.
37. 302 U.S. at 326. (Emphasis added). Justice Cardozo goes on to speak in particular
of the importance of "freedom of thought, and speech." Id. at 326-27. See also note 46 infra.
38. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 288 (1952) (Jackson, J. dissenting)
(questioning the view of the other dissent that the first amendment is incorporated in the
fourteenth) ; Roth v. United States, 354, U.S. 476, 505-06 (1957) (Harlan, J. separate
opinion) (dangers of a uniform standard as to pornography under the First Amendment ap-
plied to the state). The opinions of the Court may have applied the same substantive standard
as would apply to the federal government under the Bill of Rights, but have avoided explicit
language of incorporation. See Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 156 (1961) (Brennan, J.,
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suggest that as to these provisions-the origin and perhaps a principal moti-
vation for "selective incorporation"-one might arrive where that doctrine
would take us, though by another path.
Substantive due process in concept and in its development is, of course, quite
different from "procedural due process," although the Court has found them
both in the same clause. Due process of law in the original Bill of Rights,
while its total impact is less than clear, surely had procedural connotations.
The same phrase was probably designed to impose some procedural limitations
on the states when it was written into the fourteenth amendment. To deter-
mine the scope of these safeguards the Court interpreted the words "due
process," holding that the process that is due is that which conforms to ac-
cepted notions of "dueness," to the demands of civilized conscience.
"Substantive due process," on the other hand, may be wholly a judicial
creation. It was first found in the fifth amendment in the Dred Scott case.39
However, when "due process of law" appeared in the fourteenth amend-
ment, it is far from agreed that it intended substantive limitations on what
state legislatures might do. Substantive due process, as is well known, found
its origin and its wild and questionable growth in regard to economic regu-
lation; only comparatively recently has it begun to protect political and civil
liberties. In regard to the latter, when the Court decided, say, that freedom
of speech enjoyed protection from state encroachment, it was asserting that
the "liberty" of which a person may not be deprived includes the freedom of
speech. Liberty, it later held, included other freedoms, indeed "the full range
of conduct which the individual is free to pursue."40 Surely, the Court has
found, it included those liberties whose significance was expressly honored in
the first and fourth amendments.
One may say, then, that the liberties mentioned in the Bill of Rights were,
in this sense, "incorporated" or "absorbed" in the "liberty" protected by the
fourteenth amendment.4' It remained to be determined what is the standard
of protection accorded to these liberties. The scope of the protection has in-
deed been found in the phrase "due process," but here it means something
different from what it means as procedural due process. The standard of sub-
stantive due process is not "conscience" or "fairness" as in the procedural
cases. Substantive due process, we know, has suggested to the modern Court
dissenting). See also note 47 infra. Compare, e.g., the Court's opinion in Lanza v. New York,
370 U.S. 139, 142 (1962), with Justice Harlan's concurrence, 370 U.S. at 147.
39. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
40. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,499 (1954).
41. See text accompanying note 37 supra. There is no problem of selection here; all
substantive rights, even those perhaps outdated ones in the second and third amendments.
are liberties entitled to some protection. The Court has apparently also treated breach by
the states in the separation of church and state, or state establishment of religion, as de-
privations of "liberty" which affected individuals have standing to vindicate. E.g., Engel
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) ; cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). See also
School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230, 256 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring). In fact, "non-establishment" and the "wall of separation" figure largely in
state cases although no one has suggested that they apply differently to the federal govern-
ment.
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standards for permissible limitations on property different from those on lib-
erty, and perhaps, too, different standards for limitations on different liberties.
In regard to property, or even "economic liberties," the standard has been
reduced to mere "reasonableness" of end and means. For "civil liberties" it
has meant much greater protection. For property or liberty the standard has
reflected developing values, developing attitudes on the relation of government
and individual, of order and liberty, applied to the issues of a new day. Ex-
cept to those who think that the first amendment speaks clearly and ab-
solutely,42 however, these same developed values in fact determine the pro-
tection accorded by the substantive amendments too-the scope of "respecting
an establishment" or "prohibiting the free exercise" of religion, of "abridging"
the freedom of speech or of the press, and other ambiguities in the first
amendment, as of "the right to be secure" against "unreasonable searches
and seizures" in the fourth amendment. To those who see in these amend-
ments flexible standards reflecting respective needs of order and of liberty, it
is easy to suggest that there is no reason to assume different values in this
regard as concerns the action of the states.43 In terms of incorporation, then,
one may say that the liberties mentioned in the first and fourth amendments
are incorporated in "liberty" in the fourteenth, and that the values of order
and liberty which determine the protection accorded against the federal gov-
ernment by the substantive amendments are the same as-are congruent with
if not "incorporated" in-substantive "due process of law" applicable to the
states.
This suggestion, I emphasize, does not depend merely on linguistic parsing
of the different phrases of the due process clause. The point is that if the
fourteenth amendment is deemed to afford substantive protection for "lib-
erty," it should surely protect the fundamental and established liberties. And
if the Court is creating a standard of protection for these liberties, it may
well look to the standards of protection which it has developed for these lib-
erties in regard to the federal government. Surely it may look to those same
standards if, as most of the Justices accept, the substantive provisions are
"specific" only in identifying the right protected, but not as to elaborating the
standard of protection, and the latter must derive from contemporary enlight-
enment. The fact is that without having explicitly accepted incorporation, the
Court never seems to have found in the explicit provisions of the early amend-
ments some standard higher than that to be applied to the states. And even
the individual Justices who have insisted that the standard is different have
42. Mr. Justice Black, of course, applies the first amendment to the states as part of
his total incorporation of the Bill of Rights, supra note 4. Alternatively, he might say that
the provisions of the first amendment are within the "liberty" protected by the fourteenth
amendment. On either basis, Mr. Justice Black might say the "absolute character of the
prohibition of the first amendment applies equally to the states.
43. To say that the standard is the same for the states as for the federal government is
to suggest the same process of balancing and the same values in the balance. It does not mean
that all governmental interests, state or federal, weigh the same. The interest of the United
States in advance military censorship in time of war might outweigh the liberty to speak or
publish, where a state's concern to prevent libel, by advance censorship, might not.
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not been able to articulate and justify two different standards.4 4 Whether one
calls it incorporation or not, identical standards for federal and state govern-
ments apparently are established. Incorporating the procedural provisions of
the Bill of Rights, on the other hand, would automatically apply to the states
provisions of considerable specificity, including the accretions those amend-
ments have acquired in the history of their application to the federal govern-
ment. Some of these may not fall within the notion of fairness and ordered
liberty that is the core of procedural due process. True, in some situations, as
in the right to counsel, there may indeed be congruity with federal protection.
In others, congruity may not be required by "due process." There seems no
occasion to seek it by an artificial process of incorporation.
I am suggesting, then, that the concept of incorporation might be applied
to the substantive liberties in the Bill of Rights, though difficult to accept as
to the procedural provisions.45 (Perhaps, indeed, this distinction accords with
the view of Mr. Justice Cardozo, although he apparently saw both kinds of
due process as aspects of "ordered liberty.") 46 Incorporating some provisions
of the Bill of Rights and not others needs no special justification. There is,
of course, no necessary logical link or relation between the substantive pro-
visions of the early amendments and the procedures later in the Bill of
44. See note 38 supra.
45. One need not become enmeshed in difficult distinctions betveen substance and pro-
cedure which elsewhere trouble the law. Substantive due process and procedural due process
are phrases of recognized content describing different constitutional limitations on govern-
ment. And there appears to be no difficulty in separating those provisions of the Bill of
Rights which may be called liberties (and deemed incorporated in "liberty" in the fourtenth
amendment) from those provisions which prescribe procedures required of the federal
government (to which the fourteenth amendment does not speak). Some of the liberties
incorporated may raise special procedural problems. The right to be secure from unreason-
able search and seizure is an incorporated liberty and the standard of protection applies in
the same manner against the states as against federal authorities. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25 (1949) ; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). If the exclusion of evidence obtained by
unreasonable search and seizure is deemed an integral incident of the protection for the
liberty, presumably the exclusion of evidence would also be "incorporated." If the exclusion
is not a necessary incident of the substantive protection it can be required of the states only if
it is an aspect of ordered liberty, or on some other basis. The Court has in fact required
exclusion without basing it on incorporation. See note 30 supra. In regard to the first
amendment, too, the Justices have differed as to whether speech or publication subject to
regulation (e.g., for obscenity) can be screened in advance or only punished thereafter. Such
questions might properly be considered problems in procedural due process with the same
standard, presumably, under the fifth and fourteenth amendments. If the propriety of the
procedures involved in regulating obscenity were deemed integral to the protection accorded
by the first amendment, they would presumably also be "incorporated" in the liberty pro-
tected against the states. Compare note 42 supra.
46. At least, in this way one can give literal meaning to his dicta about the "absorption"
of the freedoms in the early provisions of the Bill of Rights, and square, them with his de-
cision in Palko, his reservation of other double jeopardy cases (see note 24 supra), and his
treatment of Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (see note 23 mtpra). But Justice
Cardozo seems rather to distinguish what is fundamental from what is not, and puts on his
higher plan of values, note 47 infra, not only freedom of speech but also the concept of a
trial, a fair trial. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937).
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Rights. Nor has the Bill of Rights any necessary logical unity. Its historical
unity and significance (which would apply also to the tenth amendment)
has no relevance to the fourteenth amendment. What must be remembered
is that for the states we start with the fourteenth amendment, not with the
Bill of Rights. Unless, with Justice Black, one relies 'on some special intention
of the draftsmen of the amendment, that amendment has no relation to the
Bill of Rights as a whole. If one finds in the fourteenth amendment pro-
tection for the freedoms in the early amendments, but cannot find in it a re-
quirement for judicial procedures like those in the latter part of the Bill of
Rights, it is not because the former amendments "secure more important in-
dividual rights." 47 It is rather that one must find some basis for finding in
the fourteenth amendment any relation to the Bill of Rights at all. And in
the fourteenth amendment, where any incorporation must lie, one may read-
ily find that the "liberty" protected includes the liberties of the early amend-
ments, but it seems difficult to find that the judicial "process" that is "due"
relates to the later provisions of the Bill of Rights, incorporates some of them
but not all of them, and incorporates them whole. Language aside, the distinc-
tion we have suggested appears to accord with the separate and different
development and significance of substantive due process from that of proce-
dural due process in the history of the Constitution.
Whether or not one accepts this suggested distinction between the protec-
tions afforded to substantive rights and the concept of fairness applied to
criminal procedure, one may still conclude that, within the established standard
of "ordered liberty," some safeguards contained in provisions of the Bill of
Rights might in fact be applied equally to the states, others might not. The
suggestion that protections of the Bill of Rights must in all cases be applied
exactly to the states, if they be applied at all, is difficult to support as a niatter
of constitutional language or of the jurisprudence of the Court, or to justify
on any other relevant considerations. It creates its own rigidities and runs
counter to the direction of growth of the Constitution to embody flexible
standards permitting the increase of individual safeguards with the growing
enlightenment of contemporary civilization. Even the strongest libertarian in-
stincts do not need such a doctrine to increase protection for the rights of the
criminally accused when greater communal enlightenment suggests higher
standards to be required of the states as of the federal government.
47. [A] cloud has plainly been cast on the soundness of Twining and Adamson by our
decisions absorbing the first and fourth amendments in the fourteenth. There is no
historic or logical reason for supposing that those amendments secure more important
individual rights.
Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 159 (1960) (Brennan, 3., dissenting). Under the views sug-
gested in this Note the comparative "importance" of the substantive and the procedural rights
is irrelevant. Incorporation of the substantive provisions, it is suggested, is consistent with
the language and development of the Constitution; incorporation of the procedures is not.
Mr. Justice Brennan seems to be differing with Justice Cardozo, who in a famous passage
in Palko suggests that the freedoms of the first amendment are on "a different plane of
social and moral values," freedom of speech, for instance, being "the matrix, the indis-
pensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319,326-27 (1937).
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